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ABSTRACT 
Africa has been a politically disturbed place for centuries, during which the African people 
have been struggling for independence, living in conflicts and continuous wars, and 
fighting against poverty and diseases. There are so many problems and issues in Africa that 
almost every country is caught in one trap or another except for a few who thrived out of 
their traps and achieved relative success in economic growth. Africa has been receiving aid 
worldwide, but things are not getting better. I cannot refrain from asking questions: why is 
Africa so poor? What is preventing from growing and developing? In addition to that, what 
is hindering the progress of democracy in Africa countries? 
Many theories might explain why Africa has been the poorest continent despite its many 
valuable resources and vast amount of land. In this thesis, I mean to test my theory that 
Western influence has had a major impact on economic development and the progress of 
democracy in Africa. This influence, which I view as an ongoing effect that went through 
the past to the present, can be either good or bad. This process includes the colonial history, 
the resources and culture distribution, and also foreign aid, which I view as one of the major 
ways of implanting Western impact in the modern era. 
Africa is in desperate need of foreign aid and foreign direct investment; however, the 
influences of foreign aid and investment on economic growth and democracy promotion 
are as yet unknown. I recognize that the potential positive influence of foreign aid and 
investment on Africa’s development is hard to ignore; on the other hand, I think foreign aid 
and investment are hurting Africa’s economy because many foreign aid programs are 
designed neither to fit the economic structure that leads to promising growth nor to meet the 
need of local people. Another concern is that foreign aid is far from enough to build 
Africa’s economy and resolve issues because it is heavily unevenly distributed. 
To conduct my research I decided to do panel data analysis for all 51 African countries. In 
this study I have coded selected variables that I believe reflect of Western impact, as well as 
variables that cause different outcome of democracy and development among African 
countries. I hope this study can be as inspiring for me as it is for other people to continue on 
further studies. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Africa, Asia and Latin America once were under colonial control of Europe and the 
United States. After the third wave of democratization and independence, Asia and part of 
Latin America have been viewed as making big progress in economic and social 
development. Meanwhile, in striking contrast, many African countries are still under the 
rule of authoritarian leaders or, even worse, functioning in anarchic chaos, which generates 
many social problems such as natural resource predation, the spread of HIV and other 
deadly diseases, famine, poverty, etc. Africa’s problems are unique, because no other 
continent that possesses so many valuable resources has ended up being so poor; no 
continent has been colonized for so long and divided up by so many different European 
settlers. Recently there is a trend of political revolution around the Gulf area and North 
Africa fighting for democracy and freedom. Africa is clearly undergoing a major 
transformation, and it would be great if the growth and expansion of democratic 
governments paralleled by significant economic reforms and liberalization; however, 
Africa is the only region of the world where poverty is expected to increase during coming 
years (Moose, 1996, p. 53). In history and reality, there are many factors that contribute to 
African poverty, such as environmental conditions or historical and institutional factors 
(Rowntree, Lewis, Price, & Wyckoff, 2008, p. 178), but I believe inappropriate Western 
influence is one of the most important ones, which I will look into in this thesis. 
Alongside the general situation and severe issues across the African continent, different 
regions have their own unique problems. Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa are 
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obviously telling different stories. The countries north of the Sahara are generally 
considered more developed than those in sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the continent’s 
population resides (Dudley, 2000, p. 12). Sub-Saharan Africa is known for poverty, disease, 
violence, and refugees (Rowntree, Lewis, Price, & Wyckoff, 2008, p. 145); however, North 
Africa is doing relatively well because they have rich oil resources, and many countries in 
North Africa depend largely on oil exports.  
There are internal and external contributors for Africa’s issues. External factors such as 
the long history of colonization, along with discrimination by Europeans, Americans, and 
Southwest Asians, might be the reason for Africans’ poverty (Rowntree, Lewis, Price, & 
Wyckoff, 2008, p. 145). Internal factors are more complicated, because of the unique 
features of African culture, with an estimated one thousand different languages spoken and 
at least as many as distinct ethnic groups, Africa is perhaps the most linguistically and 
ethnically diverse of all the world’s continents (Dudley, 2000, p. 12). The diversity of 
African culture makes it hard to unify the continent through language, religion, and 
philosophy (Rowntree, Lewis, Price, & Wyckoff, 2008, p. 145). In addition, population 
density is relatively low in Africa compared to other continents’, which makes it harder to 
establish a well-functioning government. Jeffrey Herbst in his book States and Power in 
Africa argues that Africa had not developed powerful centralized states because it had low 
population density and inter-state warfare was absent (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Also, 
due to colonization, the African continent was not divided according to ethnic groups, 
religion, or culture, and this causes constant ethnic conflicts among and within nations. 
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Since the diversity of culture and religion is not in line with the division of political regime, 
the result is conflicts and warfare (Rowntree, Lewis, Price, & Wyckoff, 2008, p. 146). 
In addition to Western colonial influence that has been imposed upon Africa, the 
Western impact has not weakened at all even in the modern era. The West insists on the 
continuous lowering of the price of Africa’s raw materials and on the regular devaluation of 
Africa’s currencies; it always succeeds in this, and it also puts tariff barriers against 
Africa’s manufactured goods (Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 31). Conservative estimates put 
the financial outflow from Africa to the west at about US$200 million per day, and for 
every one dollar put into Africa, the West receives back four (Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 
32). Meanwhile foreign aid and foreign direct investment are continuously flowing to 
African nations, but things are not getting better as we speak. Even though there are 
millions of dollars that are supposed to help the poor to survive poverty, famine, and 
diseases, and to provide children with health care, food, and education, people are in the 
end still living the way they were, tortured by hunger, diseases, ignorance, and conflicts. I 
believe the effect of foreign aid largely depends on the economic structure of that state, and 
sectors that receive foreign aid can be really important as to how much influence they can 
have on domestic economic development. There are many other factors can limit, even 
reverse the function of foreign aid, such as corruption, predatory, ethnic conflicts, etc. 
A popular belief is that the improvement of political values such as democracy, political 
participation, or freedom of speech has a positive correlation with economic development. 
Since Western countries—the early pioneers of democracy—successfully adopted the 
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institutions for centuries, they believe that it should be the ultimate cure for all. The 
question is that, is it going to work for other countries? One possibility is that, given the 
huge cultural impact of the European colonizers, the import of Western culture and political 
institutions such as European languages and democracy can make it easier for African 
states and ethnic groups to adapt and unify. In addition, pursuing democracy by getting rid 
of an authoritarian leader can be the first step for the state to find a democratic way of 
resolving ethnic conflicts. Moreover, democracy can help release the capital and resources 
that were originally under control of social elites and political leaders, and ordinary people 
might finally have a chance to take advantage of those, producing development, economic 
growth, and improvement of living standards. 
Theoretically, democracy should be an important factor that associates with economic 
growth, but another, harsher possibility is that democratic movements can lead to failed 
states. Thus would-be democracies lose political and social stability, let alone economic 
growth, in such chaos. Is democracy really the solution for Africa? If African countries 
achieve democracy, will that make a difference? Even though regime type does not 
necessarily relate to growth directly, successful stories of Western democratic countries 
that achieved both democracy and development are backing up many arguments that 
democracy is the driving force for development. In this thesis, I argue that western 
influence has bad influence on Africa’s economic development and positive influence on 
the progress of democracy in Africa. In addition to that, I will look into other factors that 
might affect the correlation between democracy and development. 
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CHAPTER 2. LEADING FACTORS FOR POVERTY OF AFRICA 
There are many factors contributing to the poverty of Africa, such as natural resources, 
landlocked geographic environments, conflicts caused by religious and ethnic divergence, 
and, most severely, bad policies and execution. There are many works in the literature 
revealing existing African problems and possible factors causing those problems and thus 
hindering African countries’ economic growth. 
2.1 Colonization 
Despite that Africa has many problems of its own, there are many that caused by their 
early settlers, and the long and painful colonial history. Although Asia and South America 
suffered from colonization for a long time as well, never has a continent been divided and 
split into so many regions and territories because of colonization. Early European settlers 
split the continent regardless of the natives’ culture, religion, and tribe distribution. Africa 
became the victim of the constantly unstable political environment, and its resources and 
population were emigrating to foreign countries and continents. The division of Africa by 
European colonizers forced many major tribes to split in two or several different countries; 
some were living in the same country with other tribes; some split tribes ended up being 
ruled by different settlers who spoke different languages. Besides, different colonial 
powers turned to rule their colonies in different ways and with different policies. This 
might be another reason why some colonies are relatively doing better than others. Among 
the European settlers, France occupied the biggest amount of land while Great Britain took 
the largest population and probably the most strategically important areas of the continent; 
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other portions of the land were divided among other, smaller European powers (Obadina, 
2007, p. 43). In addition, the form of the governments and the way territory is ruled varied 
according to which European country was in control. The French tried to rule in a highly 
centralized way while the British preferred to rule through the local chiefs; also, France 
promoted their colonies adopting French culture, while Britain typically made fewer 
changes and left culture the way it was (Obadina, 2007, p. 47). Some colonial powers 
started genocide or massacres that caused continuous conflicts and chaos, which might 
hinder local economic and cultural development for a long time (Obadina, 2007, p. 47-49). 
Thus different ruling powers can lead to very different result of how countries are doing 
today. 
2.2 Religion Division 
Many people contributed to African issues such as the division of languages and 
religions across Africa continent. African people speak more than one thousand different 
languages, and there are different groups of traditional religions. The continent of Africa 
started to attract visitors way back in ancient time. As ancient Egyptian civilization 
declined, new groups came to Africa and spread their religions. According to Matthews 
(2010), “In early days of Christianity, converts multiplied in Egypt and sent missionaries 
north of the Sahara Desert[,] and in the seventh century, Muslims swept out of Arabia, 
crossed North Africa, and eventually reached Spain” (p. 41). During colonial times, British, 
French, and German settlers came to Africa and promoted Christianity. 
As the colonial power spread from North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, European 
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settlers made more people convert to Christianity, and Muslims did not reduce their effort, 
either (Matthews, 2010, p. 42). Matthews stated (2010), “Through missionary activities 
many peoples of Africa have become officially either Christian or Muslim” (p. 42). We 
cannot attribute the division of religions in Africa all to colonization: as the history tells, 
Christianity entered Egypt in the 1st century, and Islam entered Egypt in the later 7th century 
(Matthews, 2010, p. 46-47). 
2.3 Natural Resources: Blessing or Curse? 
Another question arises from the failure of Africa’s economy: the African continent 
possesses a major amount of all kinds of valuable resources such as oil, diamonds, and 
precious metals; why have Africans failed to pull things together on their own? Some 
scholars believe that the only way out of the trap of poverty is through internal efforts, such 
as economic and political reform from the inside out. Why are resources in Africa a curse? 
Many scholars have looked into Africa and come out with some explanations of its 
problems and possible solutions. Richard M. Auty first mentioned the idea of “resource 
curse,” where abundant natural resources may be less beneficial to countries at low- and 
mid-income levels of development (Auty, 1993, p. 1). This idea is followed and enhanced 
by other scholars such as Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner. Other scholars later 
have proposed the question: why did some countries that have abundant resources succeed 
while some did not? One bad effect brought by natural resources is that people usually 
focus too much on the profit made by exporting natural resources rather on constructing a 
sustainable economic structure. The reason behind the resource curse does not then lay in 
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the resource itself, but the political and economic environment, which determines the 
outcome of taking advantage of the resource. Poteete pointed out (2007), “A political 
resource curse associates valuable natural resources with rent seeking, authoritarian rule 
and political instability” (p. 544). Depending on the natural resource endowment, countries 
tend to specialize in either mineral or agricultural exports (Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 32). 
Some counties even rely exclusively on a single resource or commodity as a foreign 
exchange earner, such as oil in Nigeria and copper in Zambia (Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 
32).  
However, there are not just sad stories for those countries that have rich resources. A 
successful example like Botswana, which has the highest per capita growth rate of any 
country since the 1960s, has achieved the economic miracle as an Africa country (Easterly, 
2006, p. 28). Botswana has rich diamond mines, compared to other counterparts, but its 
story of success is not simply about resources, being one of the few countries in Africa that 
embraced democracy. Poteete argued (2007), “Botswana has not entirely avoided 
symptoms of Dutch Disease, but has kept them largely in check despite the fragility of state 
institutions when diamonds were discovered” (p. 544).  
In the end, it is not natural resource itself that leads to the poverty of African nations, 
but the way that the resources are put into use in their national economics, and the role the 
resources play in the economic structure cause those problems; in addition to that, 
problematic policies and political institutions make the situation even worse, which is why 
natural resources become a curse. In this paper, I view the function of natural resource from 
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the perspective of economic structure, and I will discuss how I measure that in the 
methodology part. 
2.4 Foreign Aid and FDI: Neocolonialism? 
Even after decolonization, Western influence has been infiltrating Africa in every 
aspect. Some view Western policies and actions over these decades as a great conspiracy 
against the African continent. Caplan stated (2008), “The collective complicity of Western 
governments and banks, multinational corporations and African business and political 
leaders in this massive fraud is a perfect example of the great conspiracy against the people 
of the continent” (p. 82). Chen Chimutengwende, the environmental and health minister in 
Zimbabwe, argues that Africa is moving from neo-colonialism to recolonization—the 
worst form of neo-colonialism (Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 34). After decolonization, 
Western developed countries and other developing countries such as China and India, 
alongside all kinds of NGOs and organizations have invested enormous aid and help into 
African countries; however, they have so many strings attached that often contradict each 
other. This often results in little payoff and inefficiency of the aid programs. In addition, 
Chimutengwende argues that because of the unbalanced trade among African countries and 
Western countries and corporations, Africa’s countries often gained much less than that of 
the Western countries, and Africa should resist foreign economic exploitation 
(Chimutengwende, 1997, p. 28-37). 
Foreign direct investment obviously tells a different story from foreign aid. They have 
different purposes: the former is seeking business profit, and while it can be better if it adds 
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some vitality and jobs to local economy, this is not exactly corporations’ priority; aid, 
however, is supposed to designed for a specific purpose, which is going to be helpful for 
local economy, to relieve poverty, to eliminate disease, to provide basic living supplies and 
infrastructure to local people. However, we are all aware of the fact that goal is far from 
reached. Scholars have mixed feelings about aid; some believe that foreign aid promotes 
African development, while others hold the opposite opinion. Foreign aid can play a big 
role in general African human and economic development, and it is usually handed over to 
the government or delivered by NGOs. The question is: has foreign aid been helpful to 
African nations? Some scholars believe that foreign aid, delivered through special 
programs, along with good policy actions can promote economic development of that 
region or country; even if it has no substitute for good government and cannot make up for 
failed economic policies, it can make a decisive difference in promoting opportunities for 
prosperity, democracy and stability around the world (Moose, 1996, p. 52-57).  
In the meantime, just as scholars have questioned the beneficial effect of natural 
resources, they have doubts about the influence of foreign aid as well. One may think 
foreign aid is very much like a curse as well; it turns out there is always something wrong 
with whatever is handed over instead of earned. Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol’s 
study states that aid is an even bigger curse that oil (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 
2005, p. 169). They argue that oil and other minerals may not be the biggest curse in 
developing countries, because in many countries the amount of foreign aid is a far larger 
share of government revenues (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2005, p. 169). In 
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addition, they conclude that being dependent on foreign aid seems to result in worsening 
democratic institutions (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2005, p. 169). Tembo 
argues that a development NGO is an agent of new imperialism, and projects lunched by 
NGOs are providing facilities that can only be accessed by well-off people, while the poor, 
suffering from disease and hunger, seem to be irrelevant (Tembo, 2003, p. 531). Isaias 
Afwerki, the president of Eritrea, argued that foreign aid programs are often 
self-perpetuating and serve the interests of donors instead of the intended beneficiaries 
(Afwerki, 1997, p. 58). 
Though there are billions of dollars that flowed to the poorest part of Africa, those 
countries are not getting better in economy. So does aid promote growth? Do countries that 
receive more aid do better than the others? I’m afraid that the answer is negative. In The 
White Man’s Burden, Willliam Easterly’s study proved that over 1950-2001 among the 
poor countries, countries with below-average aid had the same growth rate as countries 
with above-average foreign aid; so that poor countries without foreign aid had no problem 
having positive economic growth (Easterly, 2006, p. 39). If that is in fact the case, where 
did all the money go to? What kind of purpose are donors serving in the development of 
poor countries? Another study, by London School of Economics economist Peter Boone, 
found that aid financed consumption rather than investment; when he controlled for reverse 
causality, he found that aid had no effect on investment or growth (Easterly, 2006, p. 45). 
The reasons behind this might be that donor agencies give aid to poor countries with bad 
government; in addition, foreign aid is used as a reward to allied governments, no matter 
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how unsavory they are (Easterly, 2006, p. 132). 
I believe that only when foreign aid is designed to meet the need of a country or a 
particular program will it work to relieve the poverty. Aid should benefit the local economy 
in the long run, and also stimulate domestic demand in order to create a healthy competitive 
environment for local businesses and industries. Only when a healthy financial 
environment is established can African countries attract more investment to build up their 
own economy. Eventually it will come to the issue of globalization—it is inevitable, but 
Africa is far behind. 
2.5 Democracy Fits Everywhere? 
As ideology and institution imported from the west, democracy has been recognized 
as the “best” institution to pursue even though it is not in the nature of certain political 
cultures. The idea that under democracy people can pursue equal rights and freedom is 
fascinating, not to mention the examples set by the developed democratic countries that 
represent the successful combination of democracy and development since World War II.  
Even though Western policy has been neither effective for economic growth in Africa, 
nor sufficient to prevent conflicts, democracy is still highly valued by African social elites 
who had been struggling for the independence and freedom of Africa. Obadina argued 
(2007), “…Most African leaders came to value modern democratic institutions. Today, 
they generally agree that the political problems faced by most African nations since 
independence have stemmed from deficits in modern democratic culture rather than from 
too much democracy” (p. 87). 
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I believe that the poverty and other issues of Africa are not a result of its environmental 
conditions or natural resource volume, but of its instable or inefficient government or 
political institutions. Lacking an efficient and democratic government, those countries’ 
wealth and resources are controlled by a handful of powerful and rich people. Democratic 
political values and political institutions can help those countries manage and distribute the 
wealth and natural resources, so that they can be a better motivation for the economic 
development rather than a source of dispute. In Bates’ work When Things Fell Apart, he 
researched into the problems of failed states. Bates argued (2008), “searching for wealth 
and power, political elites reconfigured African political institutions, transforming them 
from multi- to single- or no-party systems or replacing civilian governments with military 
regimes” (p. 52). The consequence that comes with that is the resource and benefits are 
diverted to those who are in position that can access them rather than to the well-being of 
the public (Bates, 2008, p. 53). The strength of his argument is that he does not view 
resource, ethnic conflicts, etc. as the single contributor of economic collapse; his argument 
focuses on “the logic that systematically links these forces to the political incentives that 
underlie state failure” (Bates, 2008, p. 29).  
Once again I have to refer to the Botswana story in The White Man’s Burden: I may not 
able to tell what exactly democratic government does to achieve the economic miracle, or 
what proportion of the economic success can be attributed to the government. I can only tell 
that as one of the few countries that embrace democracy in Africa, the fact that being a 
democratic country does make a difference. The question is that, does democracy fit 
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anywhere, and does the success of democracy always come along with positive economic 
growth? 
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Coding Method, Definition of Variables and Measurement 
This paper means to examine whether Western influence has a major impact on Africa 
economic development and the progress of democracy. I am hoping to provide statistically 
based suggestions on how Western countries can help African development in the future. I 
test the relationship between democratic level and economic development. Even though 
today democracy is recognized as the “best” political institution, it is not clear whether 
democracy is directly related to development, nor is it obvious that which one is the cause 
of the other. Is democracy the ultimate trend of globalization? Does democracy only work 
in particular circumstances and environments? This paper intends to find out what are the 
factors that might make a huge difference in the relationship between democracy and 
development in Africa. All 51 African countries have been included in this paper; they 
will be grouped under the influence of different factors in the tests. 
First, I am using Polity IV data as a measurement for the level of democracy, and World 
Bank GDP data in constant dollar as the measure for economic development. I used 30 
years of data for both measurements. The reason is that by the 1980s, almost all African 
countries have gained independence; data is available for almost all countries since then. I 
conducted a histogram test using STATA to check GDP growth data; the data is normally 
distributed, except for a few positive and negative outliers. Democracy data though, 
largely distributed on the left axis, overall the data shows that economic development and 
democracy situation is Africa is not very positive. 
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Figure 1 Histogram test of GDP growth 
 
Source: World Bank, 2012. 
There are several factors that I view as important to the relationship between economic 
development and democratic level of Africa. To begin with, region can be important as 
region reflects the geographical environment of countries, which usually determines 
natural resources and economic structure. In addition, region can be a very important factor 
related to the progress of democracy, because countries within one region that might share 
similar political culture, historic background, and natural environment, and would have a 
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with the help of several variables that I categorized as “past influence” and “present 
influence.” By past influence I mean influence that has occurred in the past such as 
colonization and religion conversion; in addition to that, I defined foreign aid as “present 
influence.” Given the special historical background that Africa has, colonization is one of 
the major reasons that Africa became the way it is. In the panel data test, I will test how 
different colonial settlers and the years of independence can affect the result of economic 
growth and level of democracy. First of all, all countries are coded according to their 
colonial settlers, and all countries are categorized in three groups, which are French 
colonies, British colonies, and other colonies. Considering that different settlers tried to run 
their colonies in different ways, through different types of government and policies, I 
expect that there is going to be differentiated results. This coding method has a little defect 
that I grouped colonies other than French and British together; after all, German colonies 
can be as different from Spanish colonies as from French, so there seems to be no obvious 
reason for grouping all the other colonies together. In addition to the measurement of the 
influence of colonization, I coded another variable called “indepy” in four scales to 
measure the length of colonization: 1 being gained independence before 1960; 2 being 
gained independence between 1961 and 1965; 3 being claimed independence between 
1966 and 1970; and 4 being claimed independence after 1970. In such measurement, get a 
higher score in this variable meaning being colonized for longer time and received more 
Western influence during colonial time. The boundaries are chosen in interval of five 
years among those decades of decolonization. 
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Compared to the above dummy variables, I coded religion variables in a different 
method. I coded religion into four categories: Christian, Islam, African religion, and 
Divided. To respect the fact that many countries in Africa are largely divided by religion, I 
treated religion as dominant religion when its population takes up more than 20% of the 
total population, which is why countries can fit into several categories; if a country fit into 2 
categories or more, that country will be coded as “divided,” meaning that 2 or 3 religions 
are dividing the population and have impact on their religious practice. I admit that Africa’s 
religious situation is far more complicated because of the variety of religions that are being 
practiced across Africa continent, and the coding method I use has simplified this problem. 
Since I only use religion variables to observe the relationship between growth and 
democracy, and the effect of possible aid inflows, I think there is no need to go into details 
about different religious sects. Christianity includes Roman Catholic and Protestant; Islam 
refers to all Muslims, regardless of the religious sects; and traditional African religion 
includes all other religions that originated or are practiced in the continent of Africa. All the 
religion information I used to code this set of variables came from the book Encyclopedia 
of the Nations Africa. 
I defined foreign aid as part of “present influence” from the West, as I intended to 
discuss about aid and its relationship with natural resources, so I create another set of 
variables that I believe is important to the model—natural resource. I chose four kinds of 
resources that have unique and important value to local economy and that also are very 
often described as the “main characters” in the “resource curse” story: oil, diamond, gold 
19 
and copper,. I coded countries that are top producers of the above listed four resources. All 
the information I used to code this set of variables came from the website “Africapedia.” In 
addition to that, I sorted aid data retrieved from AidData 2.0 for 51 Africa countries in each 
country year in my regression model. In order to improve readability, I rescale the data into 
10 million USD dollars. 
3.2 Hypothesis and Test Method 
The general hypothesis in this paper is that Western influence has negative impact or no 
positive effect on developing the economy of, and promoting democracy in, Africa. To 
begin with, I hope to find positive correlation between development and democracy. And in 
the regional test, I expect to see different results in each region. I will perform regression 
tests separately on each region and then together, because I want to observe each variable’s 
effect on the relationship between development and democracy. 
Some literature shows that colonization has disastrous effect on economic growth in 
Africa, and the outcome might be different given different colonial settlers. In the test about 
colonization, I expect to observe that colony factors have negative effect on economic 
growth and the progress of democracy. In addition, I believe the longer since a country has 
gained independence, the higher growth rate and level of democracy that country will 
achieve. I am going to test this hypothesis in the tests involving colonial factors. 
In the measurement I defined “Western influence”; religion is one of the factors that I 
considered important. I think how Christianity is affecting local religious practice is an 
indicator of receiving more Western influence. Of course the effect of religion is more than 
20 
that; it is very often associated with “present influence”—foreign aid. This set of tests mean 
to find out which religion practiced is more often associated with positive growth or higher 
level of democracy and aid inflows. 
Originally about this paper and this topic, I have many thoughts about the discussion of 
economic structure, which I view as very important for local economic growth. As the 
paper developed, I still hoped I could implement this idea in test and analysis. I believe that 
foreign aid and favored policy in the proper sector of economy is vital for economic 
development. In this test that includes variables like aid inflows and natural resources, I 
intend to find out if development aid has a positive effect on economic development; 
moreover, to see if aid is biased towards certain sector but failed to generate growth, 
because some of the data required to conduct this test is not available, eventually the test 
is not proceeded as I expected. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
4.1 Political Stability and GDP Growth 
In the first test of the correlation of level of democracy and economic growth for all 
African countries, the level of democracy is measured according to the annual Polity IV 
data, using the indicator of polity2; and development is measured by GDP growth rate 
published by the Word Bank.  
Table 1 Regression test between growth and level of democracy 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 0.0824 0.011 
GDP growth and constant 3.739 0 
Note: N=1430, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and sorted from Polity IV 
and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The coefficient between level of democracy and GDP growth is 0.082, indicating that 
those two variables have positive correlation. The two variables’ correlated two-tailed 
significance value is 0.011, which is lower than 0.05, indicating that at the 0.05 significance 
level, the hypothesis that the two variables are not correlated is rejected. 
The cause of the correlation between democracy and development is not obvious, and 
there is remaining uncertainty about which one is the cause of the other. Certainly there are 
other factors affecting this relationship, later I will introduce some other variables into the 
model. The first hypothesis tested in here is: the stability of political environment of one 
country would affect the economic growth rate. 
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Figure 2 Bivariate regression graph between GDP growth and level of democracy 
 
Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Figure 3 Bivariate regression graph between growth and political stability 
 
Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
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year-to-year changes in democracy level. The larger the mean is, the more unstable that 
country is. Also this calculation tells the difference of two situations, one where some 
countries are moving back and forth in democracy, and another where some are gradually 
moving forward to democracy. The dependent variable is the average growth rate across 
thirty years. The regression formula y=-0.16x+4.19 indicates that the higher the measure of 
political instability is, the lower the growth rate is. This regression indicates that political 
stability should be a very important factor to explain growth rates. Given the average value 
of growth rate and democracy level variance for all 51 tested African countries, I select two 
groups of outliers: countries that have high measure of political instability and high growth 
rate (above average value), and countries that have low measure of political instability and 
low growth rate (below average value). 
Table 2 The political instability and average growth rate of outliers group 1* 
Country Political Instability Average Growth Rate 
Congo PRC 20.4 3.8 
Mozambique 4.2 4.7 
Sudan 10.4 4.9 
* Note: Outliers group 1 here stands for countries with average growth rate > 3.6 and  
measure of political instability > 3.6. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Among the first group I choose, all three countries have relatively high measure in 
political instability and above average growth rate in the past 30 years. Two of the three 
countries, Congo-Brazzaville and Sudan, experienced dramatic changes in democracy in 
the past 30 years, and both have a slightly growing trend in democracy level. Mozambique 
is doing much better in democracy, meaning that for more than ten years since the 1990s, its 
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democracy value changed from -6 to 5. 
Table 3 The political instability and average growth rate of outliers group 2* 
Country Political instability Average Growth rate 
Burundi 2.7 1.9 
Cameroon 0.6 2.8 
Congo Kinshasa DRC 2.5 0.1 
Djibouti 2.3 1.0 
Eritrea 2.2 3.0 
Gabon 2.1 2.0 
Ivory Coast 2.4 1.4 
Liberia 1.6 0.5 
Mali 3.4 3.5 
Senegal 2.8 3.3 
South Africa 0.2 2.3 
Togo 0.6 2.1 
Zimbabwe 3.2 0.6 
* Note: Outliers group 2 here stands for countries with average growth rate < 3.6  
and political instability < 3.6. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
In the second group, countries that have lower measures of political instability; all 
countries are not doing very well working towards democracy. Consistently bad political 
institutions might be one of the reasons why these countries are doing poorly in economic 
development when they have a stable political environment. This result indicates that 
political stability does not always associate with promising growth rate. In addition to that, 
GDP per capita data shows that, except for South Africa, Gabon, and Djibouti, the countries 
listed above are below or way below Africa average GDP per capita in the past three 
decades. 
4.2 Regional Influence 
4.2.1 Western Africa 
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The following regression test shows that, with a control for the West regional factor, 
indicating countries in Western Africa, the coefficient of GDP growth and level of 
democracy increased, indicating that the west regional variable has influence on the 
relationship of growth and democracy. 
Table 4 Regression test between growth and level of democracy and Western Africa factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0881 0.006 
GDP growth and west -.815 0.043 
GDP growth and constant 4.016 0 
Note: N=1430, “west” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Focus on the two predictors, whether they are statistically significant, and, if so, the 
direction of their relationships. The coefficient between GDP growth and level of 
democracy (polity2: b=0.088) being positive, which would indicate that higher democracy 
level is related to higher GDP growth, and it is significant (p=0.006). The coefficient 
between GDP growth and region of Western Africa (west: b=-0.815) is negative indicating 
that Western Africa countries are not doing well in GDP growth compared to other regions 
in Africa controlling for democracy, and the coefficient is significant (p=0.043). 
4.2.2 Northern Africa 
With the north regional factor, the coefficient of GDP growth and level of democracy 
increased, indicating that the north regional variable has influence on the relationship of 
growth and democracy. In this test, the coefficient between GDP growth and level of 
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democracy (polity2: b=0.094) is positive which would indicate that higher democracy level 
is related to higher GDP growth and it is statistically significant (p=0.004). Next, the 
region of Northern Africa (north: b=0.990) is positively related to GDP growth indicating 
that Northern Africa counties are doing relatively better in GDP growth compared to other 
regions in Africa. 
Table 5 Regression test between growth and level of democracy and Northern Africa factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0944 0.004 
GDP growth and north -.990 0.108 
GDP growth and constant 3.645 0 
Note: N=1430, “north” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.2.3 Eastern Africa 
With the same test, Eastern Africa countries have less significant association with GDP 
growth. Given the current status of Somalia, it is hard to make a precise measurement of its 
democratic level, and its economic data is missing from the data set. In such situation, 
Eastern Africa is still positively associated with growth. 
According to the result, the level of democracy (polity2: b=0.084), is statistically 
significant (p=0.01). The coefficient is positive which would indicate that higher 
democracy level is related to higher GDP growth. Eastern Africa countries are positively 
(east: b=0.220) associated with growth, indicating that Eastern Africa countries are doing 
relatively better in economic development comparing to other countries. 
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Table 6 Regression test between growth and level of democracy and Eastern Africa factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0840 0.010 
GDP growth and east -.220 0.680 
GDP growth and constant 3.708 0 
Note: N=1430, “east” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.2.4 Southern Africa 
The coefficient between GDP growth and level of democracy (polity2: b=0.090) is 
positive, and is significant (p=0.008); which would indicate that higher democracy level is 
related to higher GDP growth. With Southern Africa variable in the model, the coefficient 
between GDP growth and level of democracy increases, showing that the south regional 
variable has influence on the relationship of growth and democracy.  
Table 7 Regression test between growth and level of democracy and Southern Africa factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0898 0.008 
GDP growth and south -.336 0.455 
GDP growth and constant 3.838 0 
Note: N=1430, “south” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The region of Southern Africa (south: b=-0.336) has a negative coefficient with GDP 
growth indicating that Southern Africa counties are not doing well in GDP growth 
compared to other regions in Africa. Even though Southern Africa countries are doing 
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relatively better in promotion of democracy, those countries haven’t been viewed 
impressive growth rate except for Botswana. 
4.2.5 Central Africa 
Although in above tests, all regional factors cause the increase of coefficient between 
growth and the level of democracy, the coefficient of GDP growth and level of democracy 
increases one basis point with Northern Africa and Central Africa in the model, shows 
that northern and central regional factor has an even larger influence on the relationship 
between growth and the level of democracy. 
Table 8 Regression test between growth and level of democracy and Central Africa factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0919 0.005 
GDP growth and central .981 0.073 
GDP growth and constant 3.612 0 
Note: N=1430, “central” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted 
from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
In Central Africa, the coefficient between GDP growth and the level of democracy 
(polity2: b=0.092) is positive, which would indicate that higher democracy level is related 
to higher GDP growth, and it is statistically significant (p=0.005). Next, the region of 
Central Africa (central: b=0.981) has a positive coefficient with GDP growth indicating 
that Central Africa counties are positively associated with growth. 
4.2.6 All Regions 
1) Regional factors on growth 
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In this test including all regional factors, the coefficient between GDP growth and the 
level of democracy (polity2) rises significantly comparing to the coefficient in above tests 
(polity2: b=0.12), and is highly significant (p=0.001); in the meantime, the R-squared 
value rises too. Some scholars believe that geography is a very important factor that relates 
to economic development or economic growth.  
Table 9 Regression test of growth and democracy with all regional factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .115 0.001 
GDP growth and west -1.521 0.024 
GDP growth and north omitted omitted 
GDP growth and east -.719 0.337 
GDP growth and south -1.277 0.073 
GDP growth and central -.0619 0.935 
GDP growth and constant 4.743 0 
Note: N=1430, “west”, “north”, “east”, “central” and “south” are separately coded as dummy variables, while 
“polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: 
Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Some theories explain that geographical difference can lead to huge impact in custom, 
culture, religion, political philosophy, etc. and can be very influential to work culture and 
economic development. Controlling for the level of democracy (polity2), regions in west, 
east, south, and central have lower growth rate compared to Northern Africa. And when 
compared with other regions, west has a significantly lower growth rate (west: b=-1.52, 
p=0.02). 
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After I conduct the regression between economic development (GDP growth) and 
regions (all region dummy variables), the result indicates that there is no direct 
relationship between economic growth and region, although there’s statistically 
significant difference between regions such as west and central, west and north.  
Figure 4 Bivariate regression graphs between growth and each regional factor 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
(e) 
Note: (a) west; (b) north; (c) east; (d) central; (e) south. Source: World Bank, 2012. 
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However regression test between level of democracy (polity2) and regions (all region 
dummy variables) suggests that there is a strong relationship between democracy and 
region, which I will show in following test. I’m not surprised to see this result because 
political environment can be similar within region, and I believe that shared political 
culture and tradition can be important whether that country or countries within one region 
choose to pursue democracy or not. Also neighboring countries can have strong influence 
among the others, which can explain why one region is more democratic than the other. 
Even so, this doesn’t explain why one region or one country is growing faster than the 
other, and I can’t confirm that this is because of how far they have gone towards 
democracy. 
2) Regional factors on democracy 
Although region variables are not strongly related to growth, they have a much 
stronger relationship with the level of democracy. In this table, other regions have higher 
level of democracy when comparing to Northern Africa. In addition, coefficient 
associated with regions and level of democracy is highly significant. Southern Africa 
appears to be far more democratic than the rest of regions, however it hasn’t achieved 
higher growth rate than them, especially when comparing to Northern Africa. Although in 
the above tests, the coefficient between democracy and development is positive, that 
doesn’t explain why in Southern and Northern Africa, the coefficient is negative. In the 
following test, I will try to find out if such situation is caused or affected by other factors. 
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Table 10 Regression test between level of democracy and growth with all regional factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
polity2 and GDP growth .0664 0.001 
polity2 and west 4.512 0.000 
polity2 and north omitted omitted 
polity2 and east 2.124 0.000 
polity2 and South 6.191 0.000 
polity2 and central 1.397 0.015 
polity2 and constant -5.469 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “west”, “north”, “east”, “central” and “south” are separately coded as dummy variables, while 
“polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data are retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: 
Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Another interesting fact is that different from Western Africa countries, the level of 
democracy scores in Northern Africa are largely distributed below zero. The coefficient 
between level of democracy (polity2) and Northern Africa region (north) is -4.22, and is 
statistically significant. This indicates that even if Northern Africa countries are doing 
pretty well in economic development compared to Sub-Sahara Africa, most Northern 
African countries are undemocratic. In Above test, the value of Northern Africa is omitted 
to serve as a base line to be compared with other regions. Comparing to Northern Africa, 
other regions in Africa is more democratic, especially Southern Africa and Western Africa. 
Although Eastern and Central Africa are doing relatively better than Northern Africa in 
pursuing democracy, they are not as democratic as other regions in Africa, and as showed 
in Figure 5 below, both Eastern and Central Africa are negatively related to level of 
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democracy. 
Figure 5 Bivariate regression graphs between level of democracy and each regional factor 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
(e) 
Note: (a) west; (b) north; (c) east; (d) central; (e) south. Source: Polity IV, 2012. 
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4.3.1 French Colony 
In this table, there are two predictors are very important, both for whether they are 
statistically significant, and, if so, the direction of their relationships. The coefficient 
between GDP growth and level of democracy (polity2: b=0.077) is positive and 
statistically significant (p=0.017), but with French colony factor in the model, the 
coefficient between growth and level of democracy decreases. The French colony (colonyf: 
b=-0.935) has a negative coefficient with GDP growth indicating that French colonies are 
not doing well in GDP growth compared to other colonies in Africa, and it is statistically 
significant ( p=0.015). 
Table 11 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with French colony factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0767 0.017 
GDP growth and colonyf -.935 0.015 
GDP growth and constant 4.111 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “colonyf” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.3.2 British Colony 
With British colony in the model, the coefficient between GDP growth and level of 
democracy decreases as well, indicating that colonial factor seems to have influence on 
the relationship between growth and democracy. The British colony (colonyb: b=0.224) 
has a positive coefficient with GDP growth, but this is not a firm evidence that indicates 
British colony is doing better in GDP growth than others since it is not significant 
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(p=0.572). 
Table 12 Regression test between growth and democracy with British colony factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0810 0.012 
GDP growth and colonyb .224 0.572 
GDP growth and constant 3.657 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “colonyb” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.3.3 Other Colony 
The variable other colony includes Belgian colony, Portuguese colony and Spanish 
colony, and some other, like German colony.  
Table 13 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with other colony factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0834 0.009 
GDP growth and colonyo 1.429 0.002 
GDP growth and constant 3.433 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “colonyo” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The coefficient associated with other colony and growth rate is highly significant. One 
issue about this test is that, it might not be reasonable to include Belgian, Portuguese, 
Spanish, and others in one group, because these settlers all have very different ways of 
managing their colonies. I have two reasons to code this variable in this way: one is that 
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each colony settler does not form a sample that is large enough to be significant; the second 
is that this variable is more like a baseline that I use to compare with French and British 
colonies. In this test, result shows that other colony has a positive coefficient with GDP 
growth (colony: b=1.43), and it is statistically significant (p=0.002), indicating that other 
colony associates with positive growth rate. 
4.3.4 All Colonies 
It is interesting that even though the colonial origin variables have relatively significant 
effects in separate tests, the significant effects reduced when conduct the test with all 
colonial variables. It seems that colonial factors do not have much influence on the 
relationship between growth and level of democracy, because the coefficient between 
growth and level of democracy decreased comparing to the original test. 
Table 14 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with all colonial factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0806 0.012 
GDP growth and colonyf 2.664 0.046 
GDP growth and colonyb 3.360 0.012 
GDP growth and colonyo 4.337 0.001 
GDP growth and constant .520 0.689 
Note: N=1430, “colonyf”, “colonyb” and “colonyo” are coded as dummy variables. “polity2” and 
“GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; 
World Bank, 2012. 
Only the other colony variable (colonyo) seems to have a statistically significant 
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coefficient; that is positively related to growth. When comparing countries with colonial 
background and those whose country has never been colonized, it seems that countries with 
colonial background have higher or positive correlation with economic growth. More 
interestingly, the coefficient on polity2 is much like it was without the control variables – 
this control does not have the same coefficient-enhancing effect as does the control for 
region. However, one cannot conclude that colonial history does not have any bad 
influence on economic development and political culture of that country. Only that 
statement about bad influence of colonization has upon nations’ economic growth seems to 
be overstated. Additional tests prove that the difference among the coefficient on French 
colony, British colony and other colonies are statistically significant. 
Table 15 F-test among colony factors 
Regression test F (1, 1425) Prob>F 
colonyf and colonyb 2.58 0.1082 
colonyf and colonyo 11.11 0.0009 
colonyb and colonyo 3.61 0.0578 
Note: “colonyf”, “colonyb” and “colonyo” are coded as dummy variables. 
Take a look at the table above of the F-statistic test between colony dummy variables. 
The first one is finding an F value of 2.58, which, with 1425 degrees of freedom for the 
error, produces a p value of 0.11. I can be around 90% confidence that the difference 
between the coefficient on French colony (colonyf) and British colony (colonyb) is 
statistically significant. 
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In addition to that, the statistical difference between French colony and other colony, or 
between British colony and other colony, is even higher; therefore, there is a substantial 
difference among the colony settlers, just particularly what kind of difference variable 
makes is yet unknown. According to the figure below, different colonization histories do 
not seem to have a large effect on growth; especially, there isn’t much difference between 
British and French colonies. 
Figure 6 Bivariate regression graphs between growth and each colonial factor 
Note: (a) French; (b) British; (c) others; Source: World Bank, 2012. 
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democracy and French colony is negatively associated with the level of democracy. Using 
colonial settler as a categorical factor does not seem to have much influence on growth. 
However the result proves that British way of ruling their colonies helps those countries 
adapt to democracy better in post colonization era than other colonies. 
Figure 7 Bivariate regression graphs between level of democracy and each colonial factor 
  
(a) (b) 
 
(c) 
Note: (a) French; (b) British; (c) others; Source: Polity IV, 2012. 
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coefficient of years of colonization associates with growth is positive (indepy: b=0.37) and 
is statistically significant (p=0.021). This indicates that fewer years of independence 
associates with positive growth. Years of independence as an indicator to measure Western 
colonial influence, shows positive effect it has on previous colonies in economic growth; 
this once again suggests that statements about bad colonial influence on growth is 
overstated. 
Table 16 Regression test between growth and democracy with length of colonization factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0712 0.021 
GDP growth and indepy .371 0.029 
GDP growth and constant 3.026 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “indepy” is coded as a categorical predictor, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Table 17 Regression test between level of democracy and length of independence factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
polity2 and indepy .641 0.000 
polity2 and constant -2.859 0.000 
Note: N=1509, “indepy” is coded as a categorical predictor, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data 
retrieved and sorted from Polity IV dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012. 
Similarly, in this table, fewer years of independence associates with higher level of 
democracy as well (indepy: b=0.64), and is highly significant (p=0.00). Result of the above 
two tests reflect that countries that are under colonization for longer time are doing well not 
only in economic growth, but also has gained higher level of democracy. This is 
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contradictory to what I have always believed, that colonization often does more damage 
than contribution. Using years of independence as a measurement for Western influence, 
this test rejects the hypothesis that colonization only has bad impact on economic growth 
and the progress of democracy. 
Figure 8 Bivariate regression graphs between growth/ democracy and length of colonization 
  
(a) (b) 
Note: (a) GDP growth and length of independence; (b) level of democracy and length of independence;  
Source: World Bank, 2012; Polity IV, 2012. 
Above figures show that countries that have been colonized longer actually associate 
with positive growth rate and progress of democracy. Although I cannot conclude that 
colonization is a good thing for economic growth and promoting democracy, it proves 
that statement about colonization being absolutely evil is over-stated. At least 
colonization might help the promotion of democracy in countries that don’t have 
democracy imbedded in their own political culture. 
4.4 Religion Influences 
The reason I choose religion as an important factor with which to predict development 
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and democracy is that I believe religion can reflect, or, in a way, measure how much 
influence that country or region received from the West or the outside world; especially for 
Africa and its unique colonial background, religious conversion is an important part of the 
story. In this thesis, domination by Christianity is treated as a sign of receiving western 
influence. Islam on the other hand, widely spread in Middle East and Northern Africa, is 
not viewed as western influence in here, but as a variable to be compared with 
Christianity and traditional Africa religion domination. As religion has always been a 
sensitive issue, misunderstood conclusions and interpretations can be drawn from related 
topics. I hope one can see from my study that I treated this variable as an important 
historical factor, with no implication of superiority of any religion. 
4.4.1 Dominated by Christianity 
The Christian religious factor does not seem to have a particularly strong effect on 
relationship between growth and democracy. With a control for the Christian religious 
factor, the coefficient between growth and the level of democracy decreased. 
Table 18 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with Christianity factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0803 0.013 
GDP growth and religionc .274 0.520 
GDP growth and constant 3.536 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “religionc” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The level of democracy (polity2: b=0.08) has a significant (p=0.013) effect on 
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economic growth. A country’s adherence to the Christian religion (religionc: b=0.27) has 
a positive coefficient with GDP growth indicating that Christian religion country is doing 
better in GDP growth comparing to other countries in Africa. 
4.4.2 Dominated by Islam 
In this test, with Islam religious factor in the model, the coefficient between GDP 
growth and level of democracy decreases a little (polity2: b=0.08), indicating that Islam 
religion has influence on the relationship between growth and level of democracy. The 
level of democracy (polity2: b=0.08) has a significant (p=0.014) effect on growth. The 
Islamic country has a negative coefficient (religionc: b=-0.08) on growth indicating that 
Islamic countries are associating with negative growth. 
Table 19 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with Islam religion factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0811 0.014 
GDP growth and religioni -.0770 0.843 
GDP growth and constant 3.771 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “religioni” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The above two tests show that religious factors do not contribute much to the relationship 
between growth and democracy either. The coefficient between growth and democracy 
actually decreased a little comparing to the original test. 
4.4.3 Dominated by Traditional Africa Religions 
Unlike the tests conducted in the previous religious areas, being a country dominated 
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by traditional African religion (religiona) appears to have stronger effect on the relationship 
between growth and democracy. 
Table 20 Regression test between growth and democracy with traditional Africa religion factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0953 0.003 
GDP growth and religiona -1.520 0.003 
GDP growth and constant 4.013 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “religiona” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The coefficient of level of democracy (polity2: b=0.095) associates with growth and 
religion factor rises one basis point, and it is highly significant (p=0.003). The coefficient 
on being a traditional-African-religion country (religiona: b=-1.52) is highly significant 
(p=0.003), and it is negative, indicating that traditional African religious countries 
associate with lower growth rate. The reason might be that countries that are dominated or 
largely dominated by traditional African religion have received less Western influence in 
the past and present. I am not saying that those people should turn their backs on their own 
religion, culture, and beliefs. If the correlation is caused by less communication with the 
outside world, lack of communication could be the reason why economy doesn’t grow. 
Another issue is that a lot of charities and NGOs are religious and designate the aid to 
countries and programs that are religion-related. The issues that concern aid will be tested 
and discussed in the following chapters. 
4.4.4 Influenced by More Than One Religion  
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The coefficient measuring whether countries dominated by multiple religions 
associates with growth is negative (religiond: b=-0.58), indicating that countries that are 
dominated by multiple religions associate with negative growth. 
Table 21 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with religion division factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0826 0.010 
GDP growth and religiond -.581 0.145 
GDP growth and constant 3.938 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “religiond” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.4.5 All Religions 
The regression test with all religion variables shows that religion factors do not affect 
the relationship of growth and democracy as much as the region factor did, but the result 
shows that religion has a stronger effect on this relationship than did the colonial factor 
(polity2: b=0.09): the coefficient of level of democracy and growth rises about one basis 
point from what it was without religion variables. As previous tests stated, only the variable 
of countries dominated by traditional African religion (religiona: b=-2.18) shows a 
significant coefficient; that is negatively related to growth. 
In Table 23, countries that are dominated by Christianity (religionc: b=-1.95) and 
Islam (religioni: b=-3.64) have negative coefficient when predicting the level of 
democracy, and both of them are statistically significant (religionc: p=0.02; religioni: 
p=0.00).  
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Table 22 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with all regional factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0906 0.006 
GDP growth and religionc .195 0.847 
GDP growth and religioni -.500 0.623 
GDP growth and religiona -2.177 0.031 
GDP growth and religiond .515 0.609 
GDP growth and constant 4.023 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “religioni”, “religionc” “religiona” and “religiond” are coded as dummy variables, “polity2” 
and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; 
World Bank, 2012. 
Table 23 Regression test between level of democracy and growth with all regional factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
polity2 and GDP growth .0583 0.006 
polity2 and religionc -1.955 0.000 
polity2 and religioni -3.641 0.016 
polity2 and religiona .479 0.555 
polity2 and religiond 1.168 0.148 
polity2 and constant .887 0.278 
Note: N=1430, “religioni”, “religionc” “religiona” and “religiond” are coded as dummy variables, “polity2” 
and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; 
World Bank, 2012. 
Countries dominated by Islam religion are mostly located in Northern Africa. This fits 
the story, but it is yet hard to tell what causes such situation in Northern Africa. Also 
countries dominated by more than one religion seem to have positive correlation with 
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both growth (religiond: b=0.52) and level of democracy (religion: b=1.17), therefore 
religion division should not be the reason for negative growth nor low level of 
democracy. 
Figure 9 Bivariate regression graphs between growth and each religious factor 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Note: (a) Christianity; (b) Islam; (c) traditional African religion; (d) dominated by several religions; Source: 
World Bank, 2012. 
Figure 9 shows that religious factor does not have anything to do with the growth rate, 
and countries dominated by several religions do not particularly associate with positive or 
negative growth either; however, in Figure 10, countries influenced by Christianity and 
traditional African religion have a positive correlation with the level of democracy, while 
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those influenced by Islam have a negative correlation with the level of democracy. In 
addition to that, countries influenced by multiple religions do not seem to have strong 
influence on growth, but they do relate to higher level of democracy.  
Figure 10 Bivariate regression graphs between level of democracy and each religious factor 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Note: (a) Christianity; (b) Islam; (c) traditional African religion; (d) dominated by several religions; Source: 
Polity IV, 2012. 
4.5 Natural Resources 
In order to test the effect of natural resources on growth and level of democracy, I code 
four specific natural resources: oil, gold, diamond and copper. Africa has varieties of 
natural resources; some are very valuable and unique compared to agricultural resources. 
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And those resources are very often considered as a source of the “resource curse,” meaning 
that countries in possession of those resources do not do well in economic growth. The 
story of resource curse has many explanations, such as corruption, bad policies, predation, 
and so on; however, none of these are directly related to the resource itself. Countries with 
rich resources can do either well or badly; this has something to do with policies and 
political system. 
4.5.1 Top 10 African Oil Producer Countries 
In this regression test, the coefficient between GDP growth and level of democracy 
(polity2: b=0.12) is positive, and is highly significant (p=0.00), which would indicate that 
higher democracy level is related to higher GDP growth. Also with the oil variable in this 
model, the coefficient of level of democracy (polity2) with growth rises about 30% from its 
value in the original test of growth and democracy, and it has become more statistically 
significant, indicating that oil is a very influential factor in this relationship.  
Table 24 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with oil producer factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .115 0.000 
GDP growth and oil 2.360 0.000 
GDP growth and constant 3.341 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “oil” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted 
from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
In addition to that, the oil factor has a significant positive coefficient (oil: b=2.36, 
p=0.00) with growth and is highly significant, and its coefficient is positive indicating 
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that top oil producers are associating with positive growth rate in Africa. 
4.5.2 Top African Gold Producer Countries 
In this regression test, the variable of gold does not seem to have the same effect as oil, 
the level of democracy (polity2: b=0.09), is highly significant (p=0.01), and its coefficient 
with GDP growth is positive which would indicate that higher democracy level is related to 
higher GDP growth. However, with the gold variable in this model, the coefficient of level 
of democracy (polity2) with growth does not increase so much. The variable gold may have 
some effect in the democracy-growth relationship, but not a very strong one like oil does. 
The gold factor (gold: b=-0.60) has a negative coefficient with growth, indicating that top 
gold producers are associating with negative growth in Africa. 
Table 25 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with gold producer factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0851 0.008 
GDP growth and gold -.602 0.144 
GDP growth and constant 3.926 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “gold” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted 
from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.5.3 Top African Diamond Producer Countries 
In this regression test, the level of democracy (polity2: b=0.089), is highly significant 
(p=0.006), but its coefficient with GDP growth does not rise so much. The variable 
diamond may have some effect in this relationship, but not a very strong one like oil either. 
The diamond factor (diamond: b=-0.87, p=0.04) is significant and its coefficient is negative, 
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indicating that top diamond producers are associating with negative growth in Africa. 
Table 26 Regression test between growth and democracy with diamond producer factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0892 0.006 
GDP growth and diamond -.874 0.036 
GDP growth and constant 4.006 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “diamond” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and 
sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.5.4 Top African Copper Producer Countries 
In this regression test, the variable of copper also fails to cause significant increase in 
the coefficient of the level of democracy (polity2: b=0.08), however that coefficient on 
democracy is highly significant (p=0.01) and its coefficient with GDP growth is positive. 
Table 27 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with copper producer factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0839 0.010 
GDP growth and copper -.251 0.615 
GDP growth and constant 3.785 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “copper” is coded as a dummy variable, “polity2” and “GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted 
from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
The copper factor (copper: b=-0.25) has an insignificant negative coefficient with growth 
indicating that top copper producers might be associating with negative growth in Africa. 
4.5.5 All Natural Resource Factors 
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Given the result of above natural resource variables, the coefficient of level of 
democracy with GDP growth increases about 30% (polity2: b=0.12, p=0.00) with the 
natural resource variables in the model comparing to the model without resource variables, 
and it is highly significant. Oil factor seems to have a very significant effect on growth and 
level of democracy compared to the other resources’. In an additional test including all 
variables in the model, coefficients on countries that are top producers in gold, diamonds, 
and copper have slightly changed, but the test result is not really significant (in each case, p > 
0.05). Those resource indicators have to be examined further before one rashly comes to 
the conclusion that they are bad for growth and the progress of democracy. 
Table 28 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with all resource factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .119 0.000 
GDP growth and oil 2.297 0.000 
GDP growth and gold -.0295 0.947 
GDP growth and diamond -.782 0.087 
GDP growth and copper .237 0.657 
GDP growth and constant 3.341 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “oil”, “gold”, “diamond” and “copper” are coded as dummy variables, “polity2” and 
“GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; 
World Bank, 2012. 
Even so, in the regression test with these four resource variables, oil shows statistical 
significance not only in its positive coefficient in growth, but also its negative effect in the 
level of democracy, as Figure Error! Reference source not found.34 shows below. 
53 
In this table, the coefficient of oil as a predictor of the level of democracy is highly 
significant (oil: b=-3.20, p=0.00). Indicating that even though oil is very often associated 
with positive growth, it is very much likely to be connected with autocracy, which makes 
perfect sense that in countries where the state institution is weak, people in power turn to 
take control over the valuable resources. Economic growth in such situation depend 
largely on policies, undemocratic countries with good policies can still achieve 
impressive growth rate. 
Table 29 Regression test between level of democracy and growth with all resource factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
polity2 and GDP growth .0771 0.000 
polity2 and oil -3.196 0.000 
polity2 and gold -.262 0.463 
polity2 and diamond .913 0.013 
polity2 and copper .825 0.054 
polity2 and constant -1.486 0.000 
Note: N=1430, “oil”, “gold”, “diamond” and “copper” are coded as dummy variables, “polity2” and 
“GDPgrowth” data retrieved and sorted from Polity IV and World Bank dataset. Source: Polity IV, 2012; 
World Bank, 2012. 
In addition to that, top gold producers seem to have a negative correlation with the level of 
democracy as well, but it is not very large or significant (gold: b=-0.26, p=0.46). Top 
diamond (diamond: b=0.91, p=0.01) and copper (copper: b=0.83, p=0.05) producers are 
positively associated with level of democracy, and those relationships are statistically 
significant. 
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4.6 Foreign Aid 
In the above literature review, I spent a lot of paragraphs discussing the effect of aid, 
and how I do not really believe that aid is the way to economic growth and improvement in 
level of democracy. In this test, I gathered development aid data (aid released from 
different aid program and for different purpose) for each country-year in my study. In my 
data source, aid is categorized into 25 different purposes; I chose the ones that are related to 
economic development, regardless of the sector, as well as development aid.  
Figure 11 Kernel Density Estimation on aid in the regression model 
 
Source: Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012; AidData 2.0, 2012. 
The data is rescaled (fitted value in USD) in 10 million, and its distribution is 
positively skewed. 
4.6.1 Aid as a factor influencing growth and democracy 
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It seems that aid does not add too much effect on the relationship between democracy 
and development. The coefficient of democracy and growth rises (polity2: b=0.09, p=0.01), 
but not too much compared with its change upon the addition of other factors in the model 
in the previous tests. The coefficient of foreign aid (aidR5: b=0.22, p=0.11) with GDP 
growth is positive, but not significant enough to conclude that aid can generate positive 
growth. 
Table 30 Regression test between growth and level of democracy with aid factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
GDP growth and polity2 .0870 0.007 
GDP growth and aidR5 .217 0.109 
GDP growth and constant 3.084 0.000 
Note: “aidR5”, “polity2” and “GDP growth” data retrieved and sorted from AidData 2.0, Polity IV and 
World Bank dataset. Source: AidData 2.0, 2012; Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
Even though in the Table 30 test, foreign aid does not seem to have an obvious effect on 
the relationship of growth and democracy nor have a significant coefficient with GDP 
growth, in the Table 31 test, result shows that foreign aid is negatively associated with the 
level of democracy (aidR5: b=-0.38, p=0.01), and it is highly significant. The causal 
relationship between foreign aid and democracy is yet unknown, but this result presents 
the fact that country with weak democratic system get to receive more aid. It starts the 
questions: where did the money go? Did the money serve its purpose of promoting 
growth and relieve poverty? What happens if people in power get their hands on the 
money and there are no institutions to check their power? Is aid just a waste of money by 
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reinforcing the government power instead of generating growth? 
Table 31 Regression test between level of democracy and growth with aid factor 
Regression test Coefficient P-value 
polity2 and GDP growth .0582 0.007 
polity2 and aidR5 -.380 0.001 
polity2 and constant -.528 0.160 
Note: “aidR5”, “polity2” and “GDP growth” data retrieved and sorted from AidData 2.0, Polity IV and World 
Bank dataset. Source: AidData 2.0, 2012; Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
4.6.2 All Factors 
In this test, I intend to find out how aid flows and which category seems to attract most 
aid to cause the extreme imbalanced aid inflow situation in Africa. Result shows that 
Central Africa is the region that has been receiving the least aid compared to other regions; 
a separate test indicates a negative coefficient between aid and central Africa. In addition to 
that, former French colonies seem to have been receiving more aid than other colonies, 
indicating that French colonies have been receiving more influence from the west than 
other colonies. This indicates that it is too early to say that colonial influence is completely 
in the past: even though those countries have already achieved independence, their former 
colonizers have not yet given up their privilege to influence on their previous colonies. The 
question is that, is this new round of colonization or just aftermath in post-colonial era in 
order to help previous colonies to get back on their feet? 
When looking at the religious factor in above table, countries that are largely 
influenced by Christianity and Islam have been receiving more aid than have others: those 
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countries are positively associated with aid (religioni: b=0.74, p=0.00; religionc: b=1.62, 
p=0.00), and the relationships are highly significant. Unfortunately, countries dominated 
by traditional African religion practice are negatively associated with aid inflows 
(religiona: b=-0.4, p=0.055); this might be caused by religious-missioned NGOs, which 
often create programs and provide aid to countries that convert to their religion; however, 
further research needs to be performed to find out the real facts. As to the resource factor, 
countries of top oil (oil: b=-0.77, p=0.00) and diamond (diamond: b=-0.22, p=0.02) 
producers are negatively associated with aid inflows, and they are highly significant. And 
top gold producers (gold: b=0.48, p=0.00) are positively associated with aid inflows. 
Table 32 Regression test between aid and all other categorical factors 
Regression test Coefficient P-value Regression test Coefficient P-value 
aidR5 and west .385 0.007 aidR5 and colonyf .924 0.000 
aidR5 and east .468 0.005 aidR5 and colonyb .660 0.013 
aidR5 and north 1.838 0.000 aidR5 and colonyo .179 0.501 
aidR5 and central omitted omitted aidR5 and oil -.771 0.000 
aidR5 and south .0179 0.899 aidR5 and gold .509 0.000 
aidR5 and religioni .761 0.000 aidR5 and diamond -.257 0.008 
aidR5 and religionc 1.616 0.000 aidR5 and copper .0390 0.705 
aidR5 and religiona -.333 0.113 aidR5 and constant .706 0.055 
aidR5 and religiond -.440 0.030    
Source: AidData 2.0, 2012; Polity IV, 2012; World Bank, 2012. 
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CHAPTER 5. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
  It is clear that some factors I tested are vital for the economic growth and the progress 
of African countries, and some have less effect and very often have been overstated in the 
literature. As much effort as I have devoted to this study, there are still many methods that 
need to be tried in order to make this better; a lot of variables that I do not have access to 
need to be introduced to the model. I hope this study can present some facts to let people 
become aware of the reality that solving African issues is a long term process and that 
discrimination still exists. Discrimination and bias prevent us from observing the real 
problem that exists, and hinder those who are still trying to help. 
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